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RECENT STATUTE
PRISON OVERCROWDING: THE CONNECTICUT RESPONSE
19 Conn. Pub. Act 84-505 (Regular Session).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the last decade, prisoner population in the United States has
doubled to an unprecedented level, measuring 412,203 by the end of
1982.1 The avalanche of new prisoners has produced what is popu
larly termed a "prison overcrowding crisis."2
The eighth amendment's ban on inflicting cruel and unusual pun
ishment, made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment, 3
acts as a parameter for conditions of prison life. Prison population
may not so greatly exceed capacity as to create an environment which
would "shock the conscience" of a reasonable person. 4 Moreover, be
cause state penal systems incarcerate the majority of new prisoners, 5
federal judicial intrusion6 on state penal systems has grown dramati
cally in recent times. 7 The federal courts have responded with an in
creased willingness to find constitutionally mandated ceilings on state
prison populations, in some instances ordering the release of prison
1. Jacobs, The Politics of Prison Expansion, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE,
209,238 n.92 (1984) (quoting Galvin, Introduction: Prison Policy Reform Ten Years Later,
29 CRIME AND DELINQ. 495, 496 (1983».
2. Id. at 238.
3. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962); Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp.
1177, 1192 (D. Conn. 1980), affd in part and modified in part, 651 F.2d 96 (2nd Cir. 1981).
4. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1951).
5. Comment, Prison Overcrowding-Evolving Standards Evading and Increasing Prob
lem, 8 NEW ENG. J. PRISON L., 249, 251 n.3 (1982).
6. "The two principal means of seeking federal judicial review of internal state prison
practices are habeas corpus petitions and civil suits under 42 U.S.C. section 1983." Turner,
Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 23
STAN. L. REV. 473, 504 (1970-71). A section 1983 action appears preferable to a habeas
corpus proceeding as a means of challenging state prison conditions because it allows a
class action under rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 505. "Class
actions avoid mootness problems if a particular plaintiff is released, and also provide the
basis for broad injunctive relief going beyond a particular prisoner's' situation." Id. at 506.
See generally Annot, 51 A.L.R.3d 111 (1973).
7. Sentence Reform: Solution to Prison Cost Quagmire, 96 L.A. Daily J., Sept. 15,
1983, at 4, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Sentence Reform].
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ers.8 "[I]ndividual prisons or entire prison systems in at least twenty
four states have been declared unconstitutional under the eighth and
fourteenth amendments, with numerous cases still pending."9
States have approached the dilemma with a variety of options:
first, by constructing prisons in proportion to new population; 10 sec
ond, by incarcerating persons in tents, II prefab cells, warehouses, 12
mobile homes,13 camps surrounded with barbwire,14 inmate produced
prisons,15 or any other creative "lodging"; third, by accelerating the
litigation process; 16 fourth, by sentencing persons "with an eye toward
the available number of prison beds;"17 and fifth, by adopting non
incarcerative systems and shorter prison terms. 18
The first option, constructing new facilities, maintains an equilib
rium between supply of prison resources and demand for them. The
economic l9 and sociapo costs of constructing prisons, however, so
stagger the public that .construction may not be viable. Even if suffi
cient funding exists, the time needed to construct a prison21 further
burdens this option. The issue, however, must be addressed
8. Jacobs, supra note 1, at 211. See Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1178 (D.
Conn. 1980). The federal district court held that the Connecticut correction facility must
not exceed its capacity of 390 persons and ordered a reduction of prisoner population
within 45 days.
9. Comment, supra note 5, at 250.
10. Jacobs, supra note 1, at 210.
11. Supervisors Explore 'Tent Jails' to Ease Chronic Overcrowding, 96 L.A. Daily J.,
Dec. 15, 1983, Section II at 1, col. 5.
12. Sentence Reform, supra, note 7.
13. Conn. General Assembly, House Proceedings 6122 (May 7, 1984) (statement of
Rep. Gelsi).
14. Conn. General Assembly, Senate Proceedings 2051 (April 26, 1984) (statement
of Sen. Owens).
15. Conn. General Assembly, Senate Proceedings 2053 (April 26, 1984) (statement
of Sen. Gunther).
16. Conn. General Assembly, Senate Proceedings 2046 (April 26, 1984) (statement
of Sen. Owens).
17. Keeping the Lid on Prisons, 5 NAT'L L.J., Dec. 13, 1982, at 10, col. 2 [hereinafter
cited as Keeping the Lid on Prisons].
18. Jacobs, supra note 1, at 239. An example is incarceration of only violent offend
ers, with emphasis on restitution for property offenders. Keeping the Lid on Prisons, supra
note 17 at 10, col. 3.
19. Construction costs for building new maximum security institutions run as high
as $70,000 per cell in New York State, exclusive of finance charges. Jacobs, supra note I, at
217.
20. Site selection creates problems and seriously constrains prison expansion. Prop
erty owners fear reduction of property values, and danger from escapees: They object to
living in proximity to institutions that symbolize to them violence, immorality, and
degredation. Id.,
21. It takes four to five years to construct a prison. Keeping the Lid on Prisons, supra
note 17 at 10, col. 3.
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presently.22
The second option, implementing creative "lodging," also in
creases prison capacity. Theoretically, creative "lodging" represents a
potentially infinite means of expanding prison resources. The political
reality, however, suggests the general populace will not find it socially
acceptable. Additionally, the cost of satisfying constitutional require
ments such as maintaining adequate health and safety in creative
"lodging" may actually exceed similar costs in traditional prisons. 23
The third option, accelerating litigation, uses the pre-existing re
sources of the penal system in a more efficient manner. Accelerating
the litigation process, however, increases the potential for injustice.
The court focuses on caseload rather than justice. Plea-bargaining,
used in 98 percent of all criminal cases,24 threatens completely to en
gulf the judicial process.
II.

PUBLIC ACT

84-505

In an effort to avoid having the federal courts dictate a solution to
prison overcrowding25 and to preserve the safety of correction officers
and inmates,26 the Connecticut legislature incorporated options four
and five into Connecticut Public Act 84-505 (February Session), popu
larly termed the Overcrowding Emergency Powers Act. The act rede
fined the power structure in the state's penal system to ease the
overcrowding problem. In drafting the Act, Connecticut followed the
lead of Michigan27 and several other states. 28 Section 1 simply pro
vides definitions; Section 2 concentrates power within the authority of
22. Conn. Joint Standing Comm. Hearings, Judiciary 825 (March 19, 1984) (state
ment of Mr. Carbone); Conn. General Assembly, House Proceedings 6183 (May 7, 1984)
(statement of Rep. Tulisano).
23. Toilet, dining, and other facilities must be provided and "it's not so easy as pe0
ple would think." Conn. General Assembly, Senate Proceedings 2032 (April 26, 1984)
(statement of Sen. Owens).
24. Conn. General Assembly, Senate Proceedings 2037 (April 26, 1984) (statement
of Sen. Santaniello).
25. The legislative history of Public Act 84-505 underscores strongly that the Gen
eral Assembly intended the act primarily to avoid intervention by a federal court. See
Conn. Joint Standing Comm. Hearings, Judiciary 822 (March 19, 1984) (statement of Mr.
Carbone); Conn. General Assembly, Senate Proceedings 2055 (April 26, 1984) (statement
of Sen. Schneller); Conn. General Assembly, House Proceedings 6173 (May 7, 1984) (state
ment of Rep. Coleman).
26. Conn. General Assembly, Senate Proceedings 2041 (April 26, 1984) (statement
of Sen. Santaniello); Conn. General Assembly, House Proceedings 6149 (May 7, 1984)
(statement of Rep. Tulisano).
27. The Michigan legislature enacted MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 800.71 (1982),
which is essentially the same in substance as Section 2 of Conn. Pub. Act 84-505. Keeping
the Lid on Prisons, supra note 17 at 10, col. 3.
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the Commission of Correction; Section 3 allows for limited judicial
discretion; and Section 4 creates an intensive probation program.
A.

Section 2-Early Release by Commissioner

Section 2(a)(1) provides an advisory commission to recommend
to the Commissioner of Correction the capacity for incarceration of
prisoners in the state's penal system. Although the determination of
prison capacity arguably rests exclusively with the Commissioner,29
the advisory commission allows for legislative input into the process.
In the absence of the advisory commission, the Commissioner of Cor
rection would be "the final sensor of all the people in the State of
Connecticut, in relation to the fact that he determines how many peo
ple are going to end up in the institutions."3o
Section 2(a)(2) provides the Commissioner the authority to pro
mulgate regulations establishing the prison system's capacity. The
Connecticut General Assembly's Regulation Review Committee may
scrutinize his figure. 31
Section 2(a)(3) specifies factors which the legislature mandated be
taken into account in "formulating capacity." They are: sound correc
tional management principles; inmate health and safety;32 mainte
nance of order and discipline;33 availability of educational,
therapeutic, and recreational programs;34 and demand for available
correctional bed space. It would be reasonable to infer that the spe
cific factors chosen represent a response to the numerous court expres
28. According to the National Institute of Corrections, Georgia, Iowa, and New
Jersey have enacted similar laws. Id.
29. The legislative history of Conn. Pub. Act 84-505 indicates that the General As
sembly considered, but rejected, a proposal to give the Commissioner exclusive power to
determine capacity. Conn. General Assembly, House Proceedings 6138-39 (May 7, 1984)
(statement of Rep. Brouillet); Conn. General Assembly, House Proceedings 6168-69 (May
7, 1984) (statement of Rep. Dyson).
30. Conn. Joint Standing Comm. Hearings, Judiciary 819 (March 19, 1984) (state
ment of Chief State's Atty. McGuigan).
31. Conn. General Assembly, Senate Proceedings 2047 (April 26, 1984) (statement
of Sen. Owens); Conn. General Assembly, House Proceedings 6116 (May 7, 1984) (state
ment of Rep. Tulisano).
32. Overcrowding, without justification, causes serious harm to the health and well
being of inmates and constitutes impermissable punishment. Lareau v. Manson, 507 F.
Supp. 1177, 1178 (D. Conn. 1980). See also Arey v. Warden, Correctional Inst., 187 Conn.
324, 445 A.2d 916, 919 (1982).
33. Osborn v. Manson, 359 F. Supp. 1107 (D. Conn. 1973). The court stated that
when determining a possible eighth amendment violation, it takes into consideration that
prison authorities have legitimate concerns of security. Id. at 1111.
34. The potential for rehabilitation for inmates factors significantly in eighth amend
ment analysis. Comment, supra note 5, at 254.

1984]

RECENT STATUTE

393

sions of their relevance in determining possible violations of the eighth
amendment. 3s
Section 2(b) imposes on the Commissioner the duty to declare a
prison overcrowding emergency when the state's prison population ex
ceeds one hundred ten percent capacity for thirty consecutive days.36
Sections 2(c) and (d) and (e) prescribe the technical procedures
the Commissioner must follow in a prison overcrowding emergency.
The subsections instruct the Commissioner to accelerate parole eligi
bility dates, thereby allowing him to release prisoners into community
residences. 37 Particularly, the legislature intended the Commissioner
first to release persons serving indeterminate or indefinite sentences. 38
Only necessity would permit the release of prisoners serving determi
nate sentences. 39
Section 2(f) prescribes a limit as to those who may never be re
leased, such as those convicted of capital felonies or those serving min
imum mandatory sentences. 40
Section 2(g) requires that the Commissioner explain his actions
after emergencies to both the Governor and a joint standing commit
tee of the General Assembly.41
B.

Section 3-Early Release by Judicial Discretion

Section 3 allows for judicial discretion in an "early release pro
gram," but varies the scope of discretion according to the classification
of the prisoner. 42 Judicial discretion is maximized if a prisoner is serv
ing a definite sentence of three years or less. "[T]he sentencing court
or judge may, after hearing and for good cause shown, reduce the sen
35. See supra notes 32, 33, 34.
36. Compare Connecticut's procedure to MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 800.71 (1982)
where the commissioner must inform the governor, who must declare the emergency.
Keeping the Lid on Prisons, supra note 17, at 10, col. 3.
37. 1984 Conn. Acts 505 (Reg. Session).
38. The General Assembly intended Public Act 84-505 to release as few physically
dangerous and violent individuals as possible. Inevitably, however, danjl:erous or violent
prisoners will be released. Conn. General Assembly, House ProceediI'?l'- 6119 (May 7,
1984) (statement of Rep. Tulisano).
39. "[T]o make punishment more certain, some states have moved to determinate
sentencing, in which the initial courtroom sentence fixes a specific prison term, with no
time off for good behavior behind bars." Sentence Reform, supra note 7, at 4, col. 5.
40. Mandatory sentencing is growing more politically attractive a:. wide-spread pop
ularity exists in "being tough on crime." Keeping the Lid on Prisons, supra note 17, at 10,
col. 5.
41. "Legislative decision making on prison issues is typically dominated by a handful
of powerful legislators and a few crucial committees." Jacobs, supra note 1, at 226.
42. Compare to CONN. GEN. STAT., § 53a-39 (repealed 1984), which allowed the
judiciary unlimited discretion to modify sentences upon good cause.
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tence, order the defendant discharged, or order43 the defendant dis
charged on probation or conditional discharge for a period not to
exceed that to which he could have been previously sentenced."44 The
scope ofjudicial discretion is further restricted if a prisoner is serving a
definite sentence of at least two years but not more than five years.45
Despite the overlapping classifications for a prisoner serving a definite
sentence between two and three years, the general proposition grants
less judicial discretion for the prisoner with the greater sentence.
C.

Section 4-Intensive Probation

Section 4(b) allows the judiciary to release prisoners serving defi
nite sentences of between two and five years and to order that they be
entered into an intensive probation program. "The purpose of inten
sive probation is to remove convicted persons from incarceration and
place them in the community under close supervision and restriction
to ensure public safety, reduce prison overcrowding and contribute to
the rehabilitation of persons in the program."46 Probation under sec
tion 4 is "intensive" because each probationer must contact his proba
tion officer at least three times per week. 47 Weekly collateral contacts
provide further monitoring. 48 Additionally, weekly testing checks
probationers with a history of drug and alcohol abuse. 49 New Jersey,
with a similar plan, has found that many prisoners only reluctantly
participate in the program due to the extensive observation of proba
tioner activities. 50
III.

ANAL YSIS

The success of Connecticut Public Act 84-505 depends on two
factors. In granting the Commissioner of Correction a massive con
centration of power, the General Assembly weighed the efficiency at
tained against the potential for abuse. Commissioners must strictly
adhere to the prescribed guidelines. Responsible behavior on their
part will prevent the need for judicial intervention. Yet, institutional
Compare to CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-87(d)(c) (repealed 1984), which allowed the
to remain incarcerated at hislher option.
1984 Conn. Acts 505 (Reg. Session).
Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. "Collateral contacts" mean persons who have a relationship with the
probationer.
49. Id.
50. Conn. General Assembly, Senate Proceedings 2049 (April 26, 1984) (statement
of Sen. Owens).

43.
prisoner
44.
45.
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realities naturally encourage Commissioners to release prisoners early
or unnecessarily, as they would thereby make their job as prison man
ager easier. 51 Commissioners, moreover, face no political check, as
they are not elected. 52 Serving in a non-political position allows Com
missioners the ability to be objective in identifying a prison overcrowd
ing crisis: their detrimental decisions, however, may go unchecked, at
least until the judiciary or legislature has adequate time to react. The
negative impact of the situation on public opinion should not be un
derestimated. Public dissatisfaction with the penal system already has
reached its highest level. 53
In addition, the success of the intensive probation program de
pends on funding. 54 Substantial costs are easily predicted. Adminis
tration and implementation of the program require many resources.
Taxpayers may be reluctant to support the wages of probation officers,
the costs of testing for drug abuse, and other necessary expenditures.
In addition, the temptation to use the program as a "relief valve" will
vary due to the fluctuation in the number of qualified prisoners. As of
April 26, 1984, for example, Senator O'Leary observed that 25 percent
of the prison population was ineligible for intensive probation. 55
In Connecticut Public Act 84-505 the General Assembly has ap
parently constructed an effective device for solving short term prison
overcrowding problems. Michigan has experienced positive results
with its analogous statute. 56 The act's potential to alleviate over
crowding problems in the long run, however, is limited. The act fo
cuses entirely upon the early release of prisoners, totally failing to
address the issue of the recent radical increase of prison population.
Dealing with the source of the problem would be more efficient than
devising techniques to alleviate the negative effects of the penal
system.

51. Conn. General Assembly, House Proceedings 6128 (May 7, 1984) (statement of
Rep. Shays).
52. See supra note 36.
53. General disillusionment exists as to whether the prison system provides either a
deterrent or rehabilitative function. Jacobs, supra note I, at 240.
54. As of May 7, 1984, approximately $227,000 had been appropriated to the pro
gram. Conn. General Assembly, House Proceedings 6172 (May 7, 1984) (statement of
Rep. Coleman).
55. Conn. General Assembly, Senate Proceedings 2034-35 (April 26, 1984).
56. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 800.71 (West 1981). Conn. Joint Standing Comm.
Hearings, Judiciary 830 (March 19, 1984) (statement of Commissioner Lopes); Conn. Gen
eral Assembly, House Proceedings 6179 (May 7, 1984) (statement of Rep. Tulisano).
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CONCLUSION

The Connecticut legislature created Public Act 84-505 in an effort
to avoid having the federal courts dictate a solution to the prison over
crowding problem. The act satisfies the eighth amendment and, there
fore, allows the state exclusive control of its penal system. The
absence of cruel and unusual punishment prevents federal judicial in
trusion. The act redefines the power structure within the state's penal
system by concentrating enormous power in the office of the Commis
sioner of Correction and by creating an intensive probation program.
The success of the act depends primarily on responsible behavior of
the Commissioner of Correction and the availability of necessary
funding.

Raymond J. Reed

